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I. INTRODUCTION
When the victim testified during Pamela Green's trial for kidnap-
ping and gross sexual imposition, Green's lawyer, John Carlin, never
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asked her a single question.' In fact, it would have been impossible
for Carlin to cross-examine the victim because he had left the court-
room to attend a hearing for a client in another case.2 After Green
repeatedly complained about Carlin's absence and asked the judge to
provide her with another attorney who might actually stay in the
courtroom while the prosecution's principal witnesses testified, the
judge not only rejected the request but also revoked Green's bond and
remanded her to jail for the remainder of the trial.3 Not surprisingly,
Green was convicted.4
As the jury went out to deliberate David Hudson's fate at the con-
clusion of his first-degree murder trial, his attorney, Stuart Young,
left to attend to another case after telling the judge to respond as he
saw fit to any questions the jury might have.5 Not long after Young's
departure, the jury asked the judge to explain the concept of aiding
and abetting and to define the difference between first- and second-
degree murder.6 The judge responded by re-reading some of the mur-
der instructions previously given and by reading a definition of aiding
and abetting that the judge had read earlier for one of the other
charges against Hudson.7 Since Young was not present for this re-
instruction of the jury, there were no objections. The jury convicted
Hudson of first-degree murder the next day.8
These two cases bear an obvious similarity: the attorneys for both
Pamela Green and David Hudson were absent during portions of their
criminal trials in clear violation of the bedrock Sixth Amendment 9
rule that a criminal defendant has the right to have the assistance of
counsel throughout the entire trial.
When these two cases reached the Sixth Circuit on habeas corpus
review sixteen years apart, however, the court applied two very differ-
ent rules of decision. In Green, the court held that the temporary ab-
sence of her attorney automatically required a new trial regardless of
whether Green had been harmed by the temporary absence of coun-
sel.1 0 In so holding, the court applied the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Cronic,1 in which the Court endorsed a rule of "uni-
1. Green v. Am, 809 F.2d 1257, 1259 (6th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 484 U.S.
806 (1987), opinion reinstated, 839 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1988).
2. Id. at 1259-60.
3. Id. at 1260-61.
4. Id. at 1257.
5. Hudson v. James, 351 F.3d 212, 213-14 (6th Cir. 2003).
6. Id. at 214.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
10. Green v. Am, 809 F.2d 1257, 1262-64 (6th Cir. 1987).
11. 466 U.S 648, 659 & n.25 (1984).
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formly" reversing a conviction without requiring a showing of
prejudice when counsel was absent from a critical stage of the trial. 12
In Hudson, by contrast, the same Sixth Circuit concluded that Cronic
did not apply, and that Hudson was not entitled to a new trial because
he had failed to demonstrate exactly how the temporary absence of his
attorney during the trial had harmed him.13
Cases such as Hudson and Green in which defense attorneys are
temporarily absent from a criminal trial are, unfortunately, not terri-
bly unusual. These temporary-absence cases have recently produced a
significant split of authority, as exemplified by the Sixth Circuit's ap-
parently inconsistent decisions in Green and Hudson, as to whether
the defendant whose lawyer is temporarily absent must show
prejudice from the absence in order to obtain a new trial, or whether
the Cronic rule of automatic reversal applies in such situations.
Since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Gideon v. Wain-
wright,14 it has been black-letter constitutional law that a criminal
defendant enjoys an absolute Sixth Amendment right to the assis-
tance of counsel during the trial of any case in which he or she faces
the prospect of incarceration. 15 Because of the fundamental impor-
tance of the right to counsel, the Court has repeatedly affirmed that
the denial of the right to counsel is a "structural" error-an error re-
quiring automatic reversal of a criminal defendant's conviction with-
out any showing of prejudice.16
Until very recently, the lower courts had nearly uniformly applied
the rule of automatic reversal to any absence of counsel during any
significant portion of a criminal trial. Since 2002, however, several
lower courts, including three federal circuits, have concluded that the
rule of automatic reversal does not necessarily apply to significant but
temporary absences during criminal trials, and that instead, the de-
fendant must point to specific prejudice arising from counsel's absence
to obtain relief.17
In this Article, I will argue that these recent refusals to apply the
Cronic rule to temporary absences of counsel during trial are wrong.
12. Green, 809 F.2d at 1262-64.
13. Hudson, 351 F.3d at 216-18.
14. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
15. See, e.g., Shelton v. Alabama, 535 U.S. 654, 662-63 (2002) (holding Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel violated when indigent defendant was convicted of misde-
meanor without benefit of counsel and was sentenced to probation, the violation
of which could result in jail sentence).
16. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30 (1993) ("The existence of
structural defects-deprivation of the right to counsel, for example-requires au-
tomatic reversal of the conviction because they infect the entire trial process.").
17. See, e.g., United States v. Toliver, 330 F.3d 607, 613-14 (3d Cir. 2003) (refusing to
apply automatic reversal to absence of counsel at colloquy with deliberating jury);
Hudson, 351 F.3d at 216-18 (same); Ellis v. United States, 313 F.3d 636, 643-44
(1st Cir. 2002) (same).
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In other words, I will argue that the result in Pamela Green's case was
correct and the result in David Hudson's case was incorrect because
the absence of counsel from any significant portion of a criminal trial
should automatically result in a new trial, unless the defendant has
specifically waived the right to have counsel present.
In support of this argument, I will first show that there are no doc-
trinal reasons to explain the recent refusal of the lower courts to apply
the Cronic rule of automatic reversal in temporary-absence cases. On
the contrary, in Bell v. Cone,' 8 the Supreme Court's most recent case
applying the Cronic standard, the Court concluded that the rule of
automatic reversal did not apply to the alleged deficient performance
of defense counsel in that case, but took pains to reaffirm that actual
absence of counsel from a critical stage remains an error that does
require automatic reversal. 19
Second, I shall argue that, even aside from precedent, the Cronic
rule of automatic reversal should apply to temporary absences of coun-
sel during criminal trials because such errors are truly "structural"-
that is, not amenable to meaningful harmless-error review. A review-
ing court cannot possibly assess the effect of counsel's absence from a
cold transcript because such review completely misses an essential
part of counsel's role: to tailor his or her case to the reactions of the
jury. As a corollary to that point, practical considerations require that
temporary attorney absences during trial be treated as structural er-
ror because it is very difficult to identify exactly what counsel would
have done had he been present when he was, in fact, not present. In
other words, because trial judges realize that it will usually be impos-
sible for criminal defendants to establish prejudice from the tempo-
rary absence of their attorneys, appellate courts must apply the
Cronic rule to firmly discourage judges from conducting any trial pro-
ceedings without counsel present.
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL AT TRIAL
To understand why the temporary absence of counsel from a crimi-
nal trial should be treated as an error requiring automatic reversal of
a resulting conviction, it is first necessary to review the established
contours of the right to counsel in criminal cases. In this Part, I will
briefly review the historical development of the constitutional right to
counsel. In doing so, I will emphasize how the doctrine has developed
to require the assistance of counsel throughout an entire criminal case
18. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696-98 (2002).
19. See id. at 695 ("A trial would be presumptively unfair, we said [in Cronic], where
the accused is denied the presence of counsel at 'a critical stage .... .'" (quoting
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S 648, 662 (1984))).
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from the moment charges are filed through a first appeal of the
conviction.
I will then discuss how the Supreme Court came to regard the
right to counsel as so fundamental that a violation of the right became
structural error-that is, error requiring automatic reversal of a con-
viction. I will distinguish the Court's cases holding that various types
of attorney error are subject to harmless-error review from those hold-
ing that absence of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings are
not subject to such review.
A. A Brief Historical Review of the Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused in a criminal case
the "Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 20 Despite this seemingly
clear language, however, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was
initially understood to mean only that a criminal defendant who could
afford to retain an attorney would be allowed to have the attorney as-
sist with the defense. 2 1 The drafters of the Sixth Amendment deemed
this provision necessary because at the time of the American Revolu-
tion, English law did not permit a criminal defendant charged with a
felony, other than treason, to have counsel assist him or her at trial.22
The Sixth Amendment was thus not understood to guarantee federal
defendants the right to appointed counsel, nor, as a matter of histori-
cal practice, did any of the colonies provide counsel to indigent crimi-
nal defendants.
Until 1932, the constitutional right to counsel consisted of nothing
more than the right of a criminal defendant to hire a lawyer to assist
him or her at trial. In that year, however, the Court held for the first
time in Powell v. Alabama that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Pro-
cess Clause requires state courts to appoint counsel for indigent de-
fendants facing capital charges. 23
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
21. See generally JAMEs J. TOMKOvIcz, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
9-21 (2002) (discussing original purpose of the Sixth Amendment).
22. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-61 (1932) (discussing English law at the
time the Constitution was ratified). By the time the Sixth Amendment was rati-
fied, the English rule barring counsel in felony cases had come under criticism in
England, see 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 349 (1769) ("For upon what
face of reason, can that assistance be denied to save the life of a man, which yet is
allowed him in prosecutions for every petty trespass?"), and the American colo-
nies had rejected it, see Powell, 287 U.S. at 64-65 (explaining that at least twelve
of the thirteen colonies had rejected the English rule).
23. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71 ("[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to
employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because
of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court,
whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of
due process of law . . ").
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While Powell did not spell out exactly when counsel must be ap-
pointed in a capital case, it did stress that, once appointed, counsel's
assistance is necessary throughout the entire course of the
proceedings:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not com-
prehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.... Left with-
out the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to
prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guid-
ing hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it,
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not
know how to establish his innocence. 2 4
Just six years after Powell, the Court held in Johnson v. Zerbst25
that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the appointment of counsel for
all federal defendants lacking the means to retain their own attor-
neys. The Court in Zerbst again stressed that a criminal defendant
requires the assistance of counsel "at every step in the proceedings
against him."26 In order to ensure that the right to counsel is
honored, courts must "indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver" of that right.2 7
In 1942, the Court declined in Betts v. Brady28 to extend the Zerbst
holding of a Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel to the states
and declined to extend the Powell holding of a right to appointed coun-
sel in capital cases to non-capital cases. In so holding, the Court rea-
soned that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause "does not
incorporate, as such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth
Amendment," nor does it obligate "the states, whatever may be their
own views, to furnish counsel in every such case." 29
Betts was, of course, overruled twenty-one years later in Gideon v.
Wainwright,30 which held that the Due Process Clause does incorpo-
rate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and, therefore, states must
appoint counsel for indigent defendants in non-capital as well as capi-
tal cases. While Gideon was obviously a landmark case for the right to
counsel, the Court's opinion left open many questions, such as
whether indigents were entitled to appointed counsel for misdemean-
24. Id. at 68-69 (emphasis added).
25. 304 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1938).
26. Id. at 463 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 69).
27. Id. at 464 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy,
301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)).
28. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
29. Id. at 461-62, 471.
30. 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
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ors and petty offenses, and whether counsel was required to be ap-
pointed for pre-trial proceedings, and if so, at what point. 3 1
One point that clearly emerged from Gideon, however, is that ab-
sence of counsel from a criminal trial is structural error-again, error
requiring automatic reversal of the conviction. Gideon left no doubt
that, contrary to the Court's holding in Betts, a criminal defendant
who has been denied counsel could not receive a fair trial because
"lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of
one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental
and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours."32
Since Gideon, the Court has answered most or all of the questions
left open. The Court held in 1972 that "absent a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether
classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented
by counsel at his trial."33 Five years later, the Court confirmed that a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel begins "at or after the
time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him-
'whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment.'" 34
Of course, a defendant facing criminal charges is entitled to the
"assistance of counsel," not to have her attorney physically present
with her at every moment of the day while the charges are pending.
At the same time, the Court recognized that "today's law enforcement
machinery involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prose-
31. For an excellent contemporaneous treatment of the Gideon case, including a dis-
cussion of the issues the Court left undecided, see ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S
TRUMPET (1964).
32. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
33. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,
372-74 (1979), the Court held that Argersinger was limited to "actual imprison-
ment," so that an indigent charged with a petty offense carrying the potential of
imprisonment could be denied counsel so long as the judge did not actually sen-
tence the indigent to jail. In Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 661-62 (2002),
the Court refined the Argersinger standard further by specifying that an indigent
denied counsel for a petty offense could not be given a suspended jail sentence or
some other sentence that might result in incarceration upon violation of the
terms of probation.
34. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 689 (1972)). The Court has also held that the Fourteenth Amendment guar-
antees indigents the assistance of counsel for the first direct appeal from a crimi-
nal conviction. See Halbert v. Michigan, 125 S. Ct. 2582, 2591-94 (2005) (holding
that indigents are entitled to counsel for first-tier direct appeal by leave of appel-
late court); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding that indigents are
entitled to counsel for first-tier direct appeal by right). But see Pennsylvania v.
Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57 (1987) (holding that indigents are not entitled to
counsel for collateral review of criminal convictions); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S.
600, 610 (1974) (holding that indigents are not entitled to counsel for appeals
beyond first-tier direct appeal).
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cution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle the
accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality."3 5 There-
fore, the Court developed the notion of "critical stages" to identify
those proceedings or points in the process where a defendant is enti-
tled to the assistance of counsel because "[wihat happens there may
affect the whole trial."36 Such critical stages include, in addition to
the trial itself, virtually all types of pretrial hearings, such as arraign-
ments37 and preliminary hearings, 38 as well as various types of out-of-
court confrontations, such as police questioning3 9 and live identifica-
tion proceedings.40
In sum, a criminal defendant currently enjoys a Sixth Amendment
right to the assistance of counsel once adversarial judicial proceedings
have begun for any offense for which she faces actual imprisonment,
and she is entitled to have that counsel assist her at pretrial hearings,
throughout the trial, and at any other point in the process at which
her trial rights might be affected.
B. The Right to Counsel and the Rule of Automatic Reversal
Starting with Powell, in every case in which the Court found that a
criminal defendant had been denied the right to counsel at trial, it
simply reversed the conviction without pausing to consider whether
the denial of counsel actually affected the outcome. Given the Court's
very strong language in Powell about the necessity of counsel "every
step" of the way 4 l and the even stronger language in Gideon declaring
the right to counsel as "fundamental,"42 one could reasonably conclude
that the Court felt that it went without saying that the erroneous de-
nial of counsel was an error important enough to automatically re-
quire a new trial.
35. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). The Court in Wade concluded
that a pretrial lineup procedure was a critical proceeding for which a defendant
has the right to counsel. Id. at 236-37.
36. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961). Even though Hamilton predated
Gideon, the defendant in Hamilton was entitled to counsel under Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), because he was charged with a capital offense. Id. at
54-55.
37. Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 53-54.
38. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
39. See Williams, 430 U.S. at 401 (holding that police detective's deliberate elicita-
tion of incriminating information from defendant in the absence of counsel and
after arraignment violated Sixth Amendment).
40. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-38 (holding that live identification procedure held in
the absence of counsel after formal charges filed violated Sixth Amendment). But
see United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (holding that photographic identifi-
cation procedure held after filing of formal charges is not "critical stage" requir-
ing presence of counsel).
41. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, the absence of discussion in the early cases of
whether the error actually merited a new trial could also be chalked
up to the fact that the Court had not yet systematically considered the
question of whether all constitutional errors automatically required
new trials. It was not until 1967 that the Court finally concluded in
Chapman v. California43 that not all constitutional errors require au-
tomatic reversal.44 Instead, the Court held, the proper standard for
review of most types of constitutional error is to determine whether
the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."4 5
In holding that most constitutional errors are subject to harmless-
error review, the Court was careful to note that "our prior cases have
indicated that there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair
trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error."46
As one of three examples of such fundamental rights, the Court cited
the right to counsel announced in Gideon.4 7
The Court eventually defined the category of "structural er-
rors"48-errors requiring automatic reversal-in a more systematic
way. In Arizona v. Fulminante, the Court concluded that the errone-
ous admission of a coerced confession at trial should be subject to the
Chapman "harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt" rule, 49 despite the
footnote in Chapman, which cited the admission of a coerced confes-
43. 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1967).
44. This is not to say that the Court had automatically reversed all convictions before
Chapman upon identifying a constitutional error without considering whether
the error affected the outcome. Instead, the Court sometimes assumed, without
holding, that some showing of prejudice was required. See, e.g., Fahy v. Connecti-
cut, 375 U.S. 85, 87 (1963) (declining to decide whether admission of evidence
seized in violation of Fourth Amendment required automatic reversal because
"we find that the erroneous admission of this unconstitutionally obtained evi-
dence at this petitioner's trial was prejudicial"); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,
272 (1959) (concluding that perjured testimony knowingly introduced by prosecu-
tion violated due process and required new trial because "our own evaluation of
the record here compels us to hold that the false testimony used by the State in
securing the conviction of petitioner may have had an effect on the outcome of the
trial"). Until Chapman, however, the Court never actually held that constitu-
tional errors were subject to harmless-error analysis.
45. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
46. Id. at 23.
47. Id. at 23 n.8. The other two examples of errors requiring automatic reversal were
the use of coerced confessions and the lack of an impartial judge. Id. (citing Payne
v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).
48. The Court first used the term "structural defects" to refer to those errors requir-
ing automatic reversal in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991). Since
1996, the Court has primarily used the term "structural error" to describe such
errors. See, e.g., United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81 (2004);
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 & n.2 (2002); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S.
656, 665-67 (2001); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8, 14 (1999). But see
California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5 (1996) (per curiam) (using both terms).
49. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306-12.
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sion as an example of error requiring automatic reversal.50 In so hold-
ing, the Court distinguished an error requiring automatic reversal
from a "trial error"-that is, an "error which occurred during the pres-
entation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantita-
tively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to
determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt."51
In contrast to trial errors, the Fulminante majority continued,
structural errors, such as "the total deprivation of the right to counsel
at trial" at issue in Gideon or the presence of a biased judge, "defy
analysis by harmless-error' standards."52 Such errors, the Court rea-
soned, affect the "entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end."5 3
After setting forth several other examples of structural errors-in-
cluding racial discrimination in the selection of the grand jury that
indicted the defendant, denial of the defendant's right to represent
himself, and denial of the right to a public trial-the Court concluded
that "[e]ach of these constitutional deprivations is a similar structural
defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather
than simply an error in the trial process itself."54
On several occasions since Fulminante, the Court has stressed that
an essential distinction between a trial error and a structural error is
the inability of a reviewing court to accurately assess the impact of the
latter on the result. Thus, in Sullivan v. Louisiana, the Court unani-
mously concluded that a jury instruction that allowed a jury to convict
a criminal defendant on less proof than could establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt amounted to structural error. The Court offered two
reasons for its decision. First, the jury did not actually find any facts
beyond a reasonable doubt. 55 Second, the effect of such a defective
instruction was "necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate."5 6 On
the other hand, in Neder v. United States,57 a sharply divided Court
concluded that the omission of an element from the jury instructions
is trial error subject to harmless-error analysis because the likelihood
that the jury would have found the missing element can be quantified,
given the record of evidence admitted.
The Court has never retreated, however, from the rule that the de-
nial of the constitutional right to counsel at a critical stage is struc-
50. See supra note 47.
51. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08.
52. Id. at 309.
53. Id.
.54. Id. at 310.
55. 508 U.S. 275, 280-82 (1993).
56. Id. at 282.
57. 527 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1999).
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tural error requiring automatic reversal.5 8 The Court's clearest and
most cited statements of the rule of automatic reversal are still found
in United States v. Cronic: "a trial is unfair if the accused is denied
counsel at a critical stage of his trial," and "[tihe Court has uniformly
found constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when
counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the ac-
cused during a critical stage of the proceeding."5 9
Cronic confirmed that the rule of automatic reversal applies to
three distinct classes of counsel deprivations. First, reversal is re-
quired when counsel is absent from a critical stage of the trial. Sec-
ond, automatic reversal is necessary when counsel is present but
completely fails to subject the government's case to "meaningful ad-
versarial testing."60 The third type of error requiring automatic rever-
sal occurs when counsel is present but is somehow prevented by state
action from actually assisting the defendant at a critical stage of the
proceedings.6 1 Such "state interference" cases typically arise when a
statute, court rule, or ruling of the court prevents a defense attorney
from performing his customary functions. The Court has therefore re-
versed convictions without performing harmless-error analysis when
the judge refused to allow defense counsel to make a closing argu-
ment,62 when state law required defense counsel to call his client as
his first witness or not at all,63 when state law prevented defense
counsel from calling his client as a witness,64 and when the judge re-
fused to let defense counsel consult with his client during an overnight
recess in the trial.65
In sharp contrast to the rule of automatic reversal for a Sixth
Amendment violation that amounts to a "Cronic error," errors involv-
ing incompetent performance by defense attorneys are reviewed under
the exacting two-part test announced in Strickland v. Washington.6 6
Under the Strickland standard, the defendant is not entitled to a new
trial unless she demonstrates that her attorney performed so poorly
that he was not acting as "counsel" within the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment and that there was a "reasonable probability" of a better
58. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629 (1993); Fulminante, 499 U.S.
at 309.
59. 466 U.S. 648, 659 & n.25 (1984).
60. Id. at 659.
61. See id. at 660-61 (characterizing Powell v. Alabama as such a case, noting that
"the surrounding circumstances made it so unlikely that any lawyer could pro-
vide effective assistance that ineffectiveness was properly presumed without in-
quiry into actual performance at trial").
62. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
63. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
64. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
65. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
66. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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outcome but for her attorney's mistakes.6 7 For conflict of interest
claims, the Court developed yet another standard in Cuyler v. Sulli-
van 68 to determine whether reversal is required: whether the defen-
dant can show "that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected
his lawyer's performance."69
In sum, the Court has developed four standards of reversal appli-
cable to Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel errors. First, the Cronic
rule of automatic reversal applies to the actual or functional absence
of counsel and to state interference with the function of counsel at crit-
ical stages of the trial. Second, the Strickland rule requiring the de-
fendant to show that a different outcome was reasonably probable
applies to claims that counsel committed serious errors during their
representation. Third, the Cuyler rule requiring the defendant to
show an adverse effect on the lawyer's performance applies to claims
that counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest. And fourth,
Sixth Amendment claims not fitting within any of the above categories
are reviewed under the Chapman standard to decide whether the er-
ror was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
With this background in place, we are now ready to turn to the
question of whether the rule of automatic reversal or some other test
should apply to the temporary absence of counsel during a criminal
trial. In the next Part, I will discuss why the problem occurs at all.
III. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF TEMPORARILY
ABSENT COUNSEL
All of the Supreme Court's right-to-counsel cases have involved ei-
ther the complete denial of counsel, as in Gideon; or the presence of
counsel who is alleged to have performed deficiently, as in Strickland,
Cuyler, and the state interference cases. The Court has never
squarely confronted the problem of counsel who is present for some
portions of the trial but not all of it, though the issue has arisen many
times in state courts and the lower federal courts.
In the following sections, I shall begin with a brief discussion of
how it happens that defense lawyers can be temporarily absent during
a criminal trial. I will then show that almost all federal and state
courts formerly applied a rule of automatic reversal to such temporary
absences but that a significant split of authority on that question has
developed in recent years.
67. Id. at 687, 694.
68. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
69. Id. at 348.
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A. Where Did She Go? How and Why Counsel Goes Missing
One could be forgiven for believing that no criminal defense attor-
ney would ever miss part of a trial at which he or she is representing a
defendant. It might seem obvious that a fundamental part of the pro-
fessional responsibility of any attorney in any type of case, civil or
criminal, is to be there for the entire trial. Of course, this is true.70
Even if for some reason an attorney left or did not show up for a ses-
sion of the trial, one might reasonably assume that the judge would be
professionally obligated to postpone further proceedings until the at-
torney returned. This, of course, is also true.7 1 Even if the lawyer's
and judge's professional responsibilities and obligations were not
enough, it should be even more obvious to all concerned that counsel
must be present throughout an entire criminal trial since a criminal
defendant has a firmly established constitutional right to be repre-
sented by counsel at all critical stages of the case.
Therefore, there is no real dispute that it is a very serious constitu-
tional error when a portion of a criminal trial is conducted in the ab-
sence of the defendant's attorney (unless, of course, the defendant has
affirmatively and knowingly waived her right to have her attorney
present). Given this black-letter law, temporary-absence-of-counsel
cases should be exceedingly rare.
Nonetheless, there are a surprisingly large number of reported
cases in which defense attorneys were temporarily absent for substan-
tial periods of time during criminal trials. While there are a variety of
reasons why such absences occur, the cases tend to fall into three
categories.
The first category consists of cases in which judges affirmatively
permit attorneys to leave for portions of the trials. One typical scena-
rio in which this error occurs is when the judge permits the attorney
for one defendant in a multidefendant trial to leave, in the mistaken
belief that the continued presence of the codefendants' attorneys is
sufficient to protect the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel. For example, in Green v. Arn,72 a case discussed earlier, the judge
allowed Green's attorney to leave during the victim's testimony so
that he could attend a sentencing hearing for another client. The
judge apparently concluded that leaving Green without representa-
tion during the victim's testimony would not violate Green's rights be-
cause her attorney assured the judge before he left that he would be
content to rely on the codefendants' attorney to conduct an adequate
70. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2004) (requiring lawyer to act
'with reasonable diligence" in representing client).
71. See generally ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(7) & cmt. (2004)
(requiring judges to avoid proceedings in the absence of a party's lawyer).
72. 809 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1987).
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cross-examination. 73 Similarly, the judge in Olden v. United States74
permitted defense counsel to leave several times during the trial, in-
cluding periods during which witnesses implicated his client, after re-
ceiving assurances that Olden would rely on his codefendants'
attorneys to represent his interests.
As a variation on this scenario, the judge in a multidefendant trial
might erroneously permit counsel for one defendant to temporarily
leave on the ground that upcoming proceedings will primarily or ex-
clusively concern the codefendants. Thus, in Vines v. United States,75
the judge permitted counsel to leave for the remainder of the day be-
cause the prosecution planned to call witnesses who would testify only
about Mr. Vines' codefendants. In yet another variation, the judge
might allow defense counsel to leave the trial after counsel indicates
that he does not believe that his presence is necessary. In Hudson v.
Jones,76 also discussed earlier, the judge permitted Hudson's lawyer
to leave after the lawyer announced that he would trust the judge to
properly answer any questions the jury might have during
deliberations.
A second category of temporary-absence cases consists of situations
in which impatient judges conduct proceedings without waiting for the
defendants' attorneys to arrive. This scenario has arisen most fre-
quently during jury deliberations when the jury sent out a note that
required the judge to deliver further instructions. For example, in
Curtis v. Duval,77 the judge waited twenty minutes for Curtis's attor-
ney to arrive before deciding to answer the jury's question in the ab-
sence of defense counsel. The judge in French v. Jones7 s was even
more impatient; she waited only seven minutes before deciding to re-
instruct a deadlocked jury without defense counsel. The judges in El-
lis v. United States7 9 and United States v. Toliver8 O decided to answer
questions from deliberating juries without notifying or waiting for
counsel at all. While such errors most commonly have occurred dur-
ing jury deliberations, an impatient trial judge in State v. Colbert8 l
decided to proceed with jury selection when defense counsel failed to
73. Id. at 1260-61.
74. 224 F.3d 561, 568-69 (6th Cir. 2000). One of the absences was because counsel
wanted to attend a funeral. Id.
75. 28 F.3d 1123, 1125-26 (11th Cir. 1994). The Eleventh Circuit noted that the re-
cord is unclear as to exactly why counsel for Mr. Vines needed to leave. Id. at
1125 n.2.
76. 351 F.3d 212, 213-14 (6th Cir. 2003).
77. 124 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997).
78. 332 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2003). In the interests of full disclosure, I represented
Mr. French on the appeal of his conviction.
79. 313 F.3d 636, 642 (1st Cir. 2002).
80. 330 F.3d 607, 609 (3d Cir. 2003).
81. 316 S.E.2d 79, 79-80 (N.C. 1984).
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show up on time. The trial judge in People v. Margan8 2 told the prose-
cutor to begin the direct examination of his first witness without wait-
ing for the defense attorney to arrive.
A third, and most notorious, category consists of cases in which
counsel is temporarily "absent," despite being physically present, be-
cause he has fallen asleep during the trial. In Javor v. United States,
for example, a magistrate found that Mr. Javor's attorney was "asleep
or dozing, and not alert to proceedings, during a substantial part of
the trial."8 3 Similarly, the defense lawyer in Tippins v. Walker84 slept
every day during the trial.
By far the most famous of the "sleeping lawyer" cases is the Texas
death penalty trial of Calvin Burdine.8 5 In a trial that consumed less
than thirteen hours of court time, Burdine's appointed lawyer, Joe
Cannon, fell asleep as many as ten times.86 To the surprise of none of
the observers of the trial, Burdine was convicted and sentenced to
death. Unfortunately, Burdine's case is far from the only example of a
capital trial during which the defense lawyer fell asleep.8 7
Thankfully, temporary absences of defense counsel during criminal
trials remain quite rare. However, as the cases discussed in this sec-
tion demonstrate, it is a constitutional error that recurs frequently
enough that it should be of concern to the criminal justice system. In
recent years, the courts have agreed that temporary absences of coun-
sel during trials are serious errors, but have not agreed on whether
the rule of automatic reversal should apply. In the next section, I dis-
cuss that split of authority.
B. Temporary Absences and Structural Error: The Recent
Shift
The many appellate courts that have confronted instances of tem-
porarily absent criminal defense attorneys since the Court issued the
Cronic and Strickland decisions in 1984 have had four possible stan-
dards of reversal from which to choose. First, a reviewing court acting
on either direct appeal or habeas corpus review could regard the tem-
82. 554 N.Y.S.2d 676, 676-77 (App. Div. 1990).
83. 724 F.2d 831, 832 (9th Cir. 1984).
84. 77 F.3d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 1996).
85. See Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
86. See id. at 338-39 (recounting testimony of three jurors and court clerk providing
varying estimates as to number of times Cannon slept during trial).
87. See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Dreaming of Effective Assistance: The
Awakening of Cronic's Call to Presume Prejudice from Representational Absence,
76 TEMp. L. REV. 827, 843-44 (2003) (discussing another capital case during
which Cannon slept); Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing
and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor when Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 829-30 (discussing three Texas capital cases, including
Burdine, during which defense counsel slept).
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porary absence of counsel from a criminal trial as a Cronic error. That
is, the court could conclude that such an absence, without a fully effec-
tive waiver, amounts to denial of counsel at a critical stage. Under the
Cronic approach, such an error is structural and therefore requires
automatic reversal of the conviction and a new trial, even if the defen-
dant cannot demonstrate that counsel's temporary absence prejudiced
him.88
Second, when acting on direct appeal, a reviewing court might con-
clude that a temporary absence of counsel is different in kind and de-
gree from the total absence or denial of counsel at issue in Gideon.
Put another way, an appellate court might decide that a temporary
absence of counsel is not structural because the effect of the error can
be assessed.8 9 If the trial court were at fault for allowing the trial to
proceed temporarily without counsel, a reviewing court on direct ap-
peal that regarded the error as non-structural would apply the Chap-
man harmless-error test. Therefore, such a reviewing court would
reverse the conviction and order a new trial unless the prosecution
could show that the temporary absence of counsel was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt.90
Third, a reviewing court on direct appeal could also regard the
temporary absence of counsel as an example of deficient representa-
tion subject to the Strickland test. Under this approach, the court
would reverse the conviction and order a new trial only if the defen-
dant could show that there was a "reasonable probability" of a better
outcome had counsel not been temporarily absent.9 1
Fourth, if the matter reached the reviewing court on federal
habeas corpus review and the court concluded that the temporary ab-
sence of counsel was not structural, the court would order a new trial
only if it concluded that the absence had a "substantial and injurious
effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."9 2
Between 1984, when the Court decided Cronic and Strickland, and
2002, almost all of the reported decisions from state and federal appel-
88. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.25 (1984) ("The Court has uni-
formly found constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when counsel
was either totally absent or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical
stage of the proceeding . . . ."); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,
629-30 (1993) (recognizing that deprivation of the right to counsel and other
structural errors require automatic reversal on habeas corpus review).
89. Cf. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280-82 (1993) (concluding that defective
reasonable doubt instruction is structural error because its effect on jury cannot
be quantified or determined).
90. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
91. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) ("[Dlefendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional er-
rors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.").
92. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
20061
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
late courts applied the Cronic rule of automatic reversal to temporary
absences of defense counsel from criminal trials.93 Given a showing
that defense counsel in a criminal trial was temporarily absent from
the trial, the usual outcome was that the conviction was reversed and
a new trial was ordered, even if the defendant could not specifically
explain how he or she was prejudiced by counsel's temporary absence.
Since mid-2002, however, most of the reported decisions have
treated temporary absences as non-structural and have therefore ap-
plied either the Chapman or Strickland tests on direct appeal or the
Brecht test on federal habeas corpus review.9 4 In other words, most
courts in the last few years have held that a temporary absence of
counsel from a criminal trial does not automatically require reversal
and have instead required some showing of prejudice before ordering a
new trial.
93. The Cronic rule of automatic reversal has been applied when counsel was tempo-
rarily absent during the taking of testimony, see, e.g., Olden v. United States, 224
F.3d 561, 568 (6th Cir. 2000); Green v. Am, 809 F.2d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1987);
People v. Margan, 554 N.Y.S.2d 676, 677-79 (App. Div. 1990); McKnight v. State,
465 S.E.2d 352, 353-54 (S.C. 1995), when counsel was absent from a sentencing
hearing, see Golden v. Newsome, 755 F.2d 1478, 1483-84 (11th Cir. 1985), and in
cases when counsel fell asleep during proceedings, see, e.g., Burdine v. Johnson,
262 F.3d 336, 345-49 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682,
685-89 (2d Cir. 1996). Other cases also provide indirect support for the use of the
Cronic rule to temporary absences of counsel. See Curtis v. Duval, 124 F.3d 1,
4-6 (1st Cir. 1997) (concluding that Cronic rule of automatic reversal would have
applied to habeas petition raising absence of counsel from jury deliberations if
trial had been held after Cronic was decided); State v. Colbert, 316 S.E.2d 79, 81
(N.C. 1984) (applying automatic reversal to temporary absence of counsel from
jury selection without citing Cronic). But see Vines v. United States, 28 F.3d
1123, 1128-31 (11th Cir. 1994) (refusing to apply Cronic and instead applying
Brecht substantial-and-injurious-effect test to habeas corpus petition raising ab-
sence of counsel during prosecution's case); United States v. Morrison, 946 F.2d
484, 502-04 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying Strickland to absence of counsel during
reinstruction of deliberating jury).
94. See, e.g., James v. Harrison, 389 F.3d 450, 454-57 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding on
habeas corpus review that state court properly applied Strickland instead of
Cronic to absence of defense counsel during jury selection); United States v. Toli-
ver, 330 F.3d 607, 613-16 (3d Cir. 2003) (refusing to apply Cronic to absence of
counsel from reinstruction of jury and instead applying Chapman test); Hudson
v. Jones, 351 F.3d 212, 216-18 (6th Cir. 2003) (refusing to apply Cronic to ab-
sence of counsel from re-reading of jury instructions); Ellis v. United States, 313
F.3d 636, 643-45 (1st Cir. 2002) (refusing to apply Cronic to counsel absence from
colloquy with deliberating jury and instead applying Brecht test to habeas corpus
petition); Hodges v. State, 116 S.W.3d 289, 292-94 (Tex. App. 2003) (refusing to
apply Cronic and instead applying Chapman to absence of counsel during pun-
ishment phase of non-capital trial). But see Caver v. Straub, 349 F.3d 340,
347-51 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying Cronic to absence of counsel from reinstruction
of deliberating jury); French v. Jones, 332 F.3d 430, 437-39 (6th Cir. 2003)
(same); State v. Perrin, 897 So. 2d 749, 752-53 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (applying
Cronic to absence of counsel from jury instructions).
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It would be difficult to overstate the importance of the change in
harmless-error tests that courts have applied to temporary-absence
cases since 2002. In almost every temporary-absence case since 1984,
a court that has applied any test other than the Cronic rule of auto-
matic reversal has ultimately ruled that the error was harmless, and
therefore, has refused to order a new trial.9 5
To put it as plainly as possible, the choice of test is almost always
outcome determinative to temporary-absence-of-counsel cases. If the
reviewing court concludes Cronic applies, as almost all courts did until
2002, the defendant will automatically receive a new trial. If, on the
other hand, the reviewing court, like the majority of courts since 2002,
concludes that a harmless-error test, and not Cronic, applies to the
temporary absence of counsel from the trial, the defendant's convic-
tion will almost certainly be affirmed.
IV. WHY TEMPORARY ABSENCES SHOULD BE REGARDED
AS STRUCTURAL ERROR
When defense counsel is absent from the courtroom (either physi-
cally not present or unconscious) during any significant portion of a
criminal trial, the defendant should automatically receive a new trial.
This was the rule that appellate courts almost always applied until
recently, but a significant split of authority has developed in the last
few years.
In this Part, I will explain why the rule of automatic reversal
should apply to temporary-absence cases. First, as a purely doctrinal
matter, I will show that there has been no recent change in the gov-
erning legal principles that can adequately explain why some courts
have refused to apply the Cronic rule to temporary-absence cases.
Second, I will argue that, aside from the state of the precedent, the
temporary absence of defense counsel is a perfect example of the type
of error that traditionally has been regarded as structural error. In
particular, the error should be seen as structural because a reviewing
court cannot possibly accurately assess the impact of a temporary ab-
sence of counsel from a critical stage of a trial. Application of the rule
of automatic reversal to temporary absences is also appropriate be-
cause, as a matter of fundamental fairness, a defendant who is tempo-
rarily abandoned should automatically receive a new trial. Finally, I
will explain why automatic reversal is necessary to reduce the in-
stances of temporary absences of defense counsel.
95. Of the numerous cases cited in the previous two footnotes, Hodges is the only one
in which a reviewing court applied a harmless-error test and still found the error
required reversal. See Hodges, 116 S.W.3d at 294. In every other case in which
the courts applied a test other than the Cronic rule of automatic reversal, the
defendant's conviction was affirmed.
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A. Supreme Court Precedent and the Recent Refusal to
Apply Cronic
Because some appellate courts have recently refused to apply the
Cronic rule of automatic reversal to cases of temporary absences, the
question naturally arises as to why there has been a shift. One possi-
ble answer is that in 2002, the Supreme Court decided Bell v. Cone,96
the first case since Cronic in which the Court has squarely considered
whether to apply the Cronic rule of automatic reversal to an alleged
functional absence of counsel.
Cone, however, did not involve an actual absence of counsel. Cone,
who had been convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sen-
tenced to death, complained in his state collateral appeal that his at-
torney had provided ineffective assistance at the penalty phase by
failing to present mitigating evidence and by waiving his opportunity
to give a final argument.9 7 The state courts, concluding that defense
counsel had represented the defendant conscientiously at the penalty
phase, rejected this claim under the Strickland standard. 98 On fed-
eral habeas corpus review, however, the Sixth Circuit concluded that
counsel's failure to make a closing argument during the penalty phase
amounted to Cronic error.9 9
By a vote of 8-1, the Supreme Court rejected the application of
Cronic to counsel's decision to waive his closing argument during the
penalty phase. Instead, the Court concluded, as the state courts had,
that Strickland supplied the proper test to assess counsel's decision to
waive argument. 10 0
In reaching that conclusion, the Court observed that Cronic had
"identified three situations implicating the right to counsel that in-
volved circumstances 'so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of
litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.'1 0 1 The
Court continued:
First and "[m]ost obvious" was the "complete denial of counsel." A trial would
be presumptively unfair, we said, where the accused is denied the presence of
counsel at "a critical stage," a phrase we used in Hamilton v. Alabama, 358
U.S. 52, 54 (1961), and White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per
curiam), to denote a step of a criminal proceeding, such as arraignment, that
held significant consequences for the accused. Second, we posited that a simi-
lar presumption was warranted if "counsel entirely fails to subject the prose-
cution's case to meaningful adversarial testing." Finally, we said that in cases
like Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), where counsel is called upon to
96. 535 U.S. 685 (2002).
97. Id. at 690-92.
98. Id. at 692 (citing Cone v. State, 747 S.W.2d 353, 356-57 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)).
99. Id. at 693 (citing Cone v. Bell, 243 F.3d 961, 979 (6th Cir. 2001)).
100. Id. at 698.
101. Id. at 695 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1984)).
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render assistance under circumstances where competent counsel very likely
could not, the defendant need not show that the proceedings were affected. 1 0 2
Cone claimed that his attorney's failure to make a closing argu-
ment fit within the second Cronic category, but the Court rejected this
argument:
When we spoke in Cronic of the possibility of presuming prejudice based on an
attorney's failure to test the prosecutor's case, we indicated that the attorney's
failure must be complete. We said "if counsel entirely fails to subject the pros-
ecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing." Here, respondent's argu-
ment is not that his counsel failed to oppose the prosecution throughout the
sentencing proceeding as a whole, but that his counsel failed to do so at spe-
cific points. 1
0 3
Given this language, it is clear that Cone cannot fairly be read as
undercutting the application of Cronic to temporary-absence-of-coun-
sel cases. On the contrary, Cone explicitly reaffirmed the first Cronic
exception: that automatic reversal is required when counsel is absent
from a critical stage. The Court could not have made it any clearer
that the language quoted above-requiring a "complete" failure to test
the prosecutor's case, as opposed to a failure to "do so at specific
points," applies only to the second Cronic exception, when counsel is
physically and mentally present but fails to meaningfully test the
prosecution's case.
While none of the courts that have recently refused to apply the
rule of automatic reversal to temporary absences of counsel have gone
so far as to claim that Cone precludes application of Cronic to such
cases, one of those courts nevertheless cited Cone for the inarguable
proposition that Cronic cases are rare.1 0 4 Two of those courts at-
tached heavy significance to the fact that the Supreme Court vacated
and remanded the Sixth Circuit's decision in French v. Joneslo5 for
reconsideration in light of Cone.10 6
Of course, the courts that thought it significant that the Supreme
Court had remanded French for reconsideration in light of Cone could
not have known for certain that the Sixth Circuit would hold on re-
102. Id. at 695-96 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted) (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at
659-62). In a footnote, the Court also noted that it had applied the rule of auto-
matic reversal in cases in which defendants "had actually or constructively been
denied counsel by government action." Id. at 696 n.3.
103. Id. at 696-97 (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659).
104. See Ellis v. United States, 313 F.3d 636, 643-44 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Cone, 535
U.S. 685, and Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002), in support of statement
that "[tihe Supreme Court recently has emphasized how seldom circumstances
arise that justify a court in presuming prejudice").
105. 282 F.3d 893 (6th Cir.), vacated, 535 U.S. 1109 (2002).
106. See United States v. Toliver, 330 F.3d 607, 614 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding French to
be "only marginally instructive" because of remand for reconsideration); Ellis,
313 F.3d at 644 n.3 (observing that Ellis' argument "is not bolstered by his reli-
ance on French v. Jones" since the Supreme Court had remanded French for re-
consideration in light of Cone).
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mand that Cone had no effect on the applicability of Cronic to the tem-
porary absence of counsel. 0 7 But it would have taken very little
analysis to realize, as the Sixth Circuit did on remand, that the
Court's refusal in Cone to apply the second Cronic exception for failure
to subject the state's case to meaningful adversarial testing had noth-
ing to do with the question of whether the first Cronic exception still
applies when counsel is absent from a critical stage of the trial. The
French court correctly and succinctly distinguished Cone:
The Supreme Court reversed [the decision in favor of Cone] because the peti-
tioner did not allege that trial counsel entirely failed to subject the prosecu-
tion's case to meaningful adversarial testing, but alleged only that trial
counsel failed at "specific points." In reaching this conclusion, the Court an-
nounced that to apply the second Cronic exception, "the attorney's failure
must be complete." . . . Cone did not deal with a denial of counsel claim. Nor
does the logic of [Cone's] holding that the attorney's failure must be complete
extend to claims based on the denial of counsel at a critical stage of the pro-
ceedings. Therefore, we conclude that Cone does not apply to claims of denial
of counsel during a critical stage.
0 8
Indeed, if the courts that thought it significant that French had
been remanded for further consideration in light of Cone had looked
more carefully at the circumstances of that remand, they might well
have reached a different conclusion. The Court remanded three cases
for reconsideration in light of Cone in June 2002, including French,
and all three were cases in which the Sixth Circuit had applied the
Cronic rule just as it had in Cone.l0 9 On the same day that the Court
remanded French for further consideration, however, it denied certio-
rari in Burdine, a case manifestly involving a temporary absence of
counsel.110 In other words, it appears the Court remanded French for
reconsideration not because the Court meant to cast doubt on the pro-
position that Cronic applies to absences of counsel from critical stages
(a proposition it had just reaffirmed in Cone), but because French
came from the same circuit as Cone.
In short, Cone reaffirmed that as a matter of doctrine, the Cronic
rule should apply to absences of counsel from critical stages of a crimi-
nal trial. There have been no decisions from the Supreme Court since
107. French v. Jones, 332 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2003).
108. Id. at 439 (citations omitted) (quoting Cone, 535 U.S. at 697). As the court noted
in French, at least two other courts had already concluded by that time that Cone
had no effect on claims involving actual absences of counsel. Id. at 439 n.6 (citing
Hunter v. Moore, 304 F.3d 1066, 1070 n.4 (11th Cir. 2002); United States ex rel.
Madej v. Schomig, 223 F. Supp. 2d 968, 971-72 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 2002)).
109. The other two cases were Mason v. Mitchell, 257 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2001) (apply-
ing Cronic to absence of counsel during pretrial period), vacated, 536 U.S. 901
(2002); and Bell v. Quintero, 256 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2001) (treating failure of coun-
sel to object to participation of biased jurors as error falling within scope of Cronic
rule), vacated, 535 U.S. 1109 (2002).
110. Cockrell v. Burdine, 535 U.S. 1120 (2002), denying cert. to Burdine v. Johnson,
262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
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Cone that would suggest otherwise. Purely as a matter of precedent,
then, it appears that the recent cases refusing to apply Cronic to tem-
porary-absence cases are difficult to defend.
B. Temporary Absence of Counsel as a Paradigm Structural
Error
The recent cases that have refused to apply the Cronic rule of auto-
matic reversal to temporary absences of counsel have treated the mat-
ter as simply one of precedent. In other words, these decisions have
simply concluded that Cronic does not apply, and therefore, the Sixth
Amendment claims of those defendants are subject to some form of
harmless-error analysis.111 What is striking in these decisions is the
lack of any substantial discussion as to whether the temporary ab-
sence of counsel should be regarded as a structural error requiring
automatic reversal, even if the language of Cronic does not clearly dic-
tate that outcome. Therefore, I will conclude with a discussion as to
why temporary-absence cases should be regarded as structural error
even if it were true that Cronic did not require that outcome.
First and most fundamentally, the temporary absence of counsel
during a criminal trial is "structural" in the sense that it is an error
that is not amenable to accurate assessment by a reviewing court be-
cause it is "necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate." 112 The
idea that a reviewing court can assess from a cold transcript the
prejudice caused by counsel's absence completely ignores the role that
counsel's physical presence in the courtroom actually plays.
The most obvious reason that the effect of the temporary absence of
counsel is impossible to accurately assess is that the reviewing court
cannot possibly discern from the transcript how the jury (or judge in a
bench trial) reacted non-verbally to the proceedings that occurred in
counsel's absence. During an ongoing trial, real-world trial counsel
make crucial decisions based on the reaction of the jury to testimony,
evidence, argument, and other courtroom proceedings.
As one example of this crucial point, counsel's presence during sup-
plemental instructions to a deliberating jury is critical not just be-
cause she might object to an improper instruction, but also because
she would watch the jury during the supplemental instructions to de-
termine whether the instructions cleared up their questions or con-
fused them further. Based on her own observations, she might
request further or clarifying instructions or even move for a mistrial.
111. See, e.g., James v. Harrison, 389 F.3d 450, 454-57 (4th Cir. 2004) (concluding
that state court reasonably held that Cronic did not apply to absence of defense
counsel during jury selection); Toliver, 330 F.3d at 613-16 (holding Cronic inap-
plicable to counsel absence from supplemental jury instruction); Ellis, 313 F.3d at
643-45 (same).
112. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280-82 (1993).
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Thus, while a supplemental instruction given in counsel's absence
might appear to an appellate court to be entirely proper, the absence
of counsel deprived the defendant of any opportunity to assure that
those instructions, delivered during the most important part of the
trial, were properly received and understood by the jury. Judge Karen
Nelson Moore eloquently made this point in her dissent to the Sixth
Circuit's reversal of the habeas corpus grant in Hudson:
[W]hat drives the unreliability of jury reinstruction in the absence of counsel
is not only counsel's inability to prevent the dissemination of erroneous new
instructions, but also counsel's incapacity to respond to whatever motivated
the jury to return to the court with some confusion or misunderstanding and
to contribute to the resolution of that problem.
While the literal re-reading of the initial jury instruction may appear to be
harmless in the sense that it imparts no new information to the jury, the
jury's desire for reinstruction or supplemental instruction is far from inconse-
quential. A jury asks for additional instructions or desires to hear the original
instructions again because its members are confused, uncertain, internally
quarreling, or because they failed to understand the instructions the first
time, possibly because of an error or problem with the original instructions.
When the jury returns to the court without a verdict, counsel, if present, can
assess whether a reinstruction is appropriate or whether supplemental in-
structions or clarifications are needed.
1 1 3
Similarly, if the attorney for one defendant in a multi-defendant
trial is absent during presentation of testimony that concerns a code-
fendant, the reviewing court cannot possibly know whether the jurors
might have found the testimony significant as to the defendant's guilt
because the appellate judges were not in the courtroom when the wit-
ness testified. If counsel had been present during the testimony, he or
she presumably would have watched the jurors for any suggestions
that the jurors regarded the testimony as relevant to his or her client.
A competent attorney who was present might well have decided to
cross-examine a witness whose testimony was, in fact, irrelevant to
the guilt of his or her client simply to drive home that point to jurors
whose expressions suggested confusion on that score.
Nonetheless, the courts refusing to apply Cronic have typically
concluded that the absences at issue were harmless because the de-
fendants were unable to specifically articulate how their attorneys'
presence could have made a difference. 1 14 The same, of course, could
very often be said in reviewing an entire trial conducted in the ab-
sence of counsel. If the prosecution has presented an overwhelming
case of guilt, it may be very difficult to imagine how an attorney could
have changed the outcome. But it is precisely because a reviewing
113. Hudson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 212, 219-20 (6th Cir. 2003) (Moore, J., dissenting).
114. See, e.g., id. at 218 (reversing grant of habeas corpus writ because "no actual
prejudice has been shown" from absence of counsel at supplemental jury instruc-
tion); Ellis, 313 F.3d at 645-46 (concluding that "it is highly improbable that the
ex parte supplemental instruction had any effect on the verdict" even though jury
returned verdict less than one hour after receiving instruction).
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court, armed with only a transcript, cannot possibly know how or
whether an attorney could have changed the outcome that absence of
counsel from a criminal trial is structural error in the first place.
A second reason that temporary absences of counsel should be con-
sidered structural error follows immediately from the first. Since it
will usually be difficult or impossible for a criminal defendant to artic-
ulate exactly what it is her attorney could have done had he been
there for the entire trial, any harmless-error rule other than auto-
matic reversal means that temporary absences will almost always be
found harmless. Indeed, as discussed in Part II, this is exactly what
has happened in recent years as some courts have applied harmless-
error analysis to temporary-absence claims.
The problem, then, with the application of harmless-error analysis
to temporary absences is that trial judges will invariably realize that
they can, when convenient, conduct trial proceedings in the absence of
defense counsel with only a minimal risk of reversal. Thus, when an
attorney asks to be excused from testimony that seems likely to per-
tain to the codefendants, the judge is very likely to grant that request
if there is little chance that doing so will result in reversal. When an
attorney does not show up on time, the judge is very likely to go ahead
with a supplemental jury instruction or even begin jury selection if the
judge knows that the defendant's likely inability to explain exactly
what the attorney could have done if present will be fatal to her claim
for a new trial.
The notion that automatic reversal is sometimes required in order
to assure compliance with an important constitutional norm is not
novel. The Supreme Court has identified several errors that require
automatic reversal because, at least in part, prejudice would be diffi-
cult to prove and the error would therefore go unchecked without an
automatic-reversal rule. In Waller v. Georgia,1 1 5 for example, the
Court concluded that a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a public trial would require automatic reversal. In so conclud-
ing, the Court endorsed the view that a "requirement that prejudice be
shown 'would in most cases deprive [the defendant] of the [public-
trial] guarantee, for it would be difficult to envisage a case in which he
would have evidence available of specific injury."'116 Similarly, in
Rose v. Mitchell,117 the Court held that racial bias in the selection of
the grand jury that indicted the defendant required automatic rever-
115. 467 U.S. 39, 49 (1984).
116. Id. at 49 n.9 (quoting United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 608
(3d Cir. 1969) (en banc)). The Waller court went on to hold that "'[blecause dem-
onstration of prejudice in this kind of case is a practical impossibility, prejudice
must necessarily be implied.'" Id. (quoting State v. Sheppard, 438 A.2d 125, 128
(Conn. 1980)).
117. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
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sal, even though his subsequent conviction by a fair trial jury estab-
lished that there was, in fact, probable cause to indict him. The Court
recognized in Rose that a rule of automatic reversal is necessary to
combat racial discrimination in grand juries because there are no
other effective ways to attack the problem." 8 The Court similarly rec-
ognized in Gray v. Mississippil'9 that automatic reversal was neces-
sary when a trial judge improperly excluded a juror from a capital
trial on the ground that the juror was opposed to capital punishment,
when the juror's responses demonstrated that she was, in fact, willing
to impose the death penalty. The error in Gray certainly could have
been considered harmless since the prosecutor apparently would have
used a peremptory challenge to remove the juror in question if the
judge had not removed her for cause, but the Court concluded that the
error required automatic reversal because, in part, "The practical re-
sult of adoption of this unexercised peremptory argument would be to
insulate jury selection error from meaningful appellate review."120
Just as the rule of automatic reversal is sometimes necessary to
assure that the grand jury selection process, jury selection at trial, or
the closing of the trial to the public does not escape appellate review,
the temporary absence of an attorney during a trial should be re-
garded as structural error as a prophylactic measure. Applying any
form of harmless-error analysis to temporary absences of counsel
would encourage judges, who are often pressed for time, to conduct
certain trial proceedings, particularly supplemental instructions to
deliberating juries, without waiting for absent counsel to arrive. So
long as the trial proceedings that occur in the absence of counsel ap-
pear upon review of the transcript to be routine and proper, an appel-
late court will almost certainly find the error in conducting those
proceedings without counsel to be harmless.
A rule of automatic reversal, however, will strongly discourage
judges from either proceeding without waiting for counsel to arrive or
allowing defense counsel to leave, just as the rule of automatic rever-
sal strongly discourages judges from closing trials to the public or fol-
lowing improper jury selection methods. Only by applying a rule of
automatic reversal can reviewing courts make it unmistakably clear
to trial judges and attorneys that such absences will not be tolerated.
Finally, a trial in which defense counsel is absent for a significant
period of time is a trial that is, by its appearances, so fundamentally
flawed that its result should not stand no matter how reliable that
result seems to be. Like some of the other structural errors the Court
118. See id. at 558 (concluding that civil actions by jurors and pretrial challenges by
defendants would be ineffective in preventing racial discrimination in grand jury
selection procedures).
119. 481 U.S. 648 (1987).
120. Id. at 665.
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has recognized, such as the lack of an impartial judge121 or the use of
racially biased jury selection procedures,12 2 the absence of counsel
also destroys the appearance of a fair trial regardless of how confident
a reviewing court might feel about the result. Any trial in which the
defense lawyer is absent (or asleep) for a substantial period of time
lacks the fundamental appearance of fairness that our system of jus-
tice requires. To put it another way, it is not too much to ask that the
defendant be given another trial upon a showing that counsel was
temporarily absent from a critical stage of the first one. As the Court
observed in the context of discriminatory jury selection procedures,
such errors "undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system
of justice."1 23 It is difficult to see how the absence of counsel from
critical stages of criminal trials would not similarly undermine the
confidence of the public in our system of justice.
V. CONCLUSION
With the recent split of authority, it appears increasingly likely
that the Supreme Court will soon have to confront the issue of
whether a temporary absence of counsel from a criminal trial is a
Cronic error.1 24 When the Court does consider such a case, one can
only hope the Court will be sensitive to the importance to a defendant
of having counsel's assistance every step of the way. When a defen-
dant such as Pamela Green or David Hudson is left to fend for herself
or himself during a trial, the trial does not pass the test of fundamen-
tal fairness, no matter what does, or does not, transpire during the
absence. Only by applying the Cronic rule of automatic reversal can
the Court help prevent such temporary absences from becoming a
common feature of American criminal trials.
121. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (concluding that defendant has due
process right to fair trial before impartial judge "no matter what the evidence was
against him").
122. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (recognizing that "our
precedents require that petitioner's conviction be reversed" upon sufficient show-
ing of purposeful discrimination by prosecutor during jury selection).
123. Id. at 87.
124. Indeed, it appears that at least one member of the Court has recently staked out
a position on the issue. In Bell v. Quintero, 125 S. Ct. 2240 (2005) (mem.), Justice
Thomas, joined by former Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented from the denial of
certiorari in a case in which the Sixth Circuit had held that trial counsel's failure
to object to the participation of biased jurors was Cronic error because it
amounted to failure to subject the state's case to meaningful adversarial testing.
In criticizing the Sixth Circuit's conclusion as contrary to Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S.
685 (2002), Justice Thomas characterized three post-Cone decisions, including
French v. Jones, 332 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2002), as "questionable applications of our
precedent." Quintero, 125 S. Ct. at 2243. Unlike Quintero, French was, of course,
a case involving a temporary absence of counsel.
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